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VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY NON.
SUITS IN MISSOURI
RUDOLPH HEITZ*

At common law a plaintiff could not be nonsuited without his consent.
That meant merely that in every case the plaintiff had the right to have
the jury return a verdict. He could not be made to suffer an involuntary
nonsuit because of any failure on his part to sustain the burden of proof.'
However, the practice developed in some states of nonsuiting a plaintiff
on defendant's motion where at the close of plaintiff's evidence it was
found his evidence was insufficient to make a case for the jury.2 This
device, called "involuntary nonsuit", differs from the practice of directing a verdict in that after a nonsuit a plaintiff can begin another action,'
whereas when a verdict is directed and found against the plaintiff, the
matter therein litigated is res adjudicata.4 Another difference is that a
plaintiff can be made to suffer an involuntary nonsuit only at the close
of his evidence,5 whereas a verdict can be directed either at the close of

*Assistant Professor oT Law, University of Kansas City. A.B., University
of Missouri, 1932, LL.B., 1934.
1. Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172 (U. S. 1859); Pochin v. Pawley, 1 Black
W. 670 (K. B. 1769). In an action on a contract against a surveyor, there being

no evidence of any contract with the surveyor, the court would have nonsuited
the plaintiff, but he refused to be nonsuited.

2. Petrillo v. Connecticut Co., 92 Conn. 235, 102 AtI. 607 (1917); Culberson v. Everett, 152 Ga. 497, 110 S. E. 275 (1921); Kraus v. National Bank

of Commerce, 140 Minn. 108, 167 N. W. 353 (*.918); Wittemann Bros. v.
Forman Bottling Co., 178 App. Div. 674, 165 ii Y.
-S
. 1, (19171; Sanders
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 201 N. C. 672, 0 S. :. 3'11 (1. ?. See also
Smith, Power to Direct Verdict (1924) 24 COL. L. !Rv. 111, i1b.
3. Johnson v. Elwood, 56 N. Y. 614 (1874); Cleary v. Quaker City Cab
Co., 285 Pa. 241, 132 Atl. 185 (1926); Crocker v. Howland, 144 Ore. 223, 24
P. (2d) 327 (1933).
4. McElroy v. Board of Education, 184 Minn. 357, 238 N. W. 681 (1931);
Standard Baking Co. v. Hi-Grade Coal & Fuel Co., 115 N. J. L. 265, 179 At].
308 (1935).
5. Dunbar v. Fant, 170 S. C. 414, 170 S. E. 460 (1933) (where directed
verdict was held proper only at close of all the evidence, while an involuntary
(131)
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plaintiff's evidence, ' or at the close of all the eviden(,e, altliough in a
few jurisdictions a verdict can be directed only at the close of all the
evidence." The practice of dismissing a plaintiff's case on motion of the
defendant for failure or lack of evidence never gained a foothold in Mis.souri

Hence, the device of an involuntary nonsuit as described above is

not a part of the Missouri practice.

Furthermore, it has been abolished

in several states in which it formerly prevailed.")
Since English v. Mullanphy" was decided in 1827, Missouri courts
have permitted a plaintiff to appeal after having taken what would in
other jurisdictions be regarded as a voluntary nonsuit-one from which
an appeal in those states would not lie t 2-- provided his nonsuit is taken as
the result of an adverse ruling of the trial court of such character as to

nonsuit was held proper only at close of plaintiff's evidence); Nowell v. Basnight, 185 N. C. 142, 116 S. E. 87 (1923). But see Toutle Logging Co. v. Hammond Lumber Co., 78 Wash. 568, 139 Pac. 625 (1914), holding an involuntary
nonsuit proper at either close of plaintiff's evidence, or at close of all the evidence.
6. Callahan v. Warne, 40 Mo. 131 (1867); Weaver v. Benton-Bellefontaine Ry., 60 Mo. App. 207 (1895); and Stierman v. Meissner, 253 S. W. 383
(Mo. App. 1923).
7. Day v. Weinstein, 148 -Md. 104, 128 AtI. 897 (1925); State ex rel.
Dunklin County v. McKay, 330 Mo. 33, 49 S. W. (2d) 125 (1932); Right Way
Cleaners v. Knappenberger, 90 Okla. 277, 217 Pac. 399 (1923).
8. Clarke v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 79 F. (2d) 564 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1935) (holding it was error to direct a verdict at close of plaintiff's
case, where plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case); DiBiase v.
Garnsey, 104 Conn. 447, 133 AtI. 669 (1926); Cantor v. Reserve Loan Life
Ins. Co., 161 S. C. 198, 159 S. E. 542 (1931).
9. Wells v. Gaty, McGune & Glasby, 8 Mo. 681 (1844); Clark v. Steamboat Mound City, 9 Mo. 146 (1845); Perrin v. Wilson, 9 Mo. 148 (1845);
Clark's Adm'x v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R., 36 Mo. 202 (1865) (where
defendant moved for *nonsuit at close of plaintiff's evidence, it was held that
the plaintiff cannot be nonsuited without his consent). In Marshall v. Wolfe,
11 Mo. 608 (1848), defendant's request for an instruction that the jury find as
in the case of a nonsuit if they find that the work was performed under a
special contract, was refused. On appeal the court said, "We do not know
that we comprehend the instruction. If it was intended by the draftsman to
obtain a non-suit of the plaintiff at the hands of the court then the court committed no error in refusing it, for neither the court nor the jury have the
power to non-suit a plaintiff who is pursuing his remedy according to the rules
of law and the practice of the court. He has an undoubted right to have his
case passed upon by a jury.
"
See also, Martin v. Henley, 13 Mo. 312
(1850).
10. In McElroy v. Board of Education, 184 Minn. 357, 238 N. W. 681 (1931),
the court granted defendant's motion to nonsuit the plaintiff at the close of
plaintiff's evidence for failure to establish his case. On appeal it was held
that dismissals were regulated by statute; dismissal for failure of proof is
not included within the statute, and the court should have directed a verdict.
However, since the taking of a verdict is a mere formality, the motion will be
considered as a directed verdict and the decision is res judicata.
11. 1 Mo. 780 (1827).
12. Schotis v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 24 F. (2d) 592 (D. C. Wash.
1928); State ex rel. Brown v. Poplarville Sawmill Co., 119 Miss. 432, 81 So.
124 (1919).
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preclude him from a substantial recovery.'-' Before a plaintiff can appeal, however, lie must first file a motion to set aside the nonsuit taken
by him' 4 and urge as the grounds for setting aside the nonsuit the adverse ruling of the trial court which he contends precludes him from obtaining such recovery."

In the event this motion is overruled and final

judgment of nonsuit or dismissal entered, the plaintiff may appeal.'"

On

appeal the plaintiff may obtain a review of the ruling against hini in
If the judgment of the lower court is reversed a new

the lower court."7

trial will be ordered.18

On the other hand, if the judgment of the lower

court is affirmed, the plaintiff stands nonsuited and may still bring another action for the same cause.' 9
A nonsuit taken by the plaintiff as the result of an adverse ruling of
the trial court which prevents a recovery is called an "involuntary nllsuit" in Missouri.20

A nonsuit taken by the plaintiff but not as the result
of an adverse ruling which prevents a substantial recovery is called a
"voluntary nonsuit." A plaintiff may appeal from an involuntary nonsuit in Missouri, but not from a voluntary nonsuit."1
the question as to whether a nonsuit is "voluntary"

Thus in Missouri
or "involuntary"

does not depend upon who is the moving party, as it does in other jurisdictions, for in Missouri in both instances the plaintiff is the party who moves
to be nonsuited.

An involuntary nonsuit as it is known in this state call

only be regarded as involuntary in the sense that the adverse ruling of
the trial court prevents any possibility of the plaintiff obtaining a verdict
and judgment in his favor.

Because of the adverse ruling it is useless for

13. Kelly-Goodfellow Shoe Co. v. Prickett, 84 Mo. App. 94 (1900); Stith v.
Newberry Co., 336 Mo. 467, 79 S. W. (2d) 447 (1934) ; Arky v. Swift & Co., 270
S. W. 438 (Mo. App. 1925). See Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 1018, when appeals
will be granted.
14. Whitfield v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 271 S. W. 52 (Mo.
1925) (motion to set aside nonsuit is a motion for a new trial).
15. In Atkinson v. Lane, 7 Mo. 403 (1842), it was held that plaintiff cannot appeal after taking an involuntary nonsuit without first filing a motion
to set the nonsuit aside. See also note 14, supra.
16. Boggess v. Cox, 48 Mo. 278 (1871); Bmnan .mi v. Purcell, 287 Mo. 436,
230 S. W. 120 (1921); Stith v. Newberry Co., S36 Mo. ae,,. 79 S. W. (2d) 447
.ainti, cainot appeal
1(ra,
(1934) (where the court refuses to set aside a
until final judgment of dismissal is entered against him).
17. Yankee v. Thompson, 51 Mo. 234 (1873).
18. McElroy v. Ford, 81 Mo. App. 500 (1899); Leesley Bros. v. Rebori Fruit
Co., 162 Mo. App. 195, 114 S. W. 138 (1912).
19. Chouteau v. Rowse, 56 Mo. 65 (1874); Chouteau v. Rowse, 90 Mo.
191 (1886).
20. Hogan-Sunkel Heating Co. v. Bradley, 320 Mo. 185, 7 S. W. (2d)
255 (1928); Diamond Rubber Co. v. Wernicke, 166 Mo. App. 128, 148 S. W.
160 (1912).
21. Segall v. Garlichs, 313 Mo. 406, 281 S. W. 693 (1926).
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him to proceed further with the trial; consequently lie is forced to take
a nonsuit.22
A plaintiff in Missouri need not move to set aside a nonsuit taken by
him even though his nonsuit was taken as the result of an adverse ruling
of the trial court which prevented a substantial recovery on his part.'
He may elect to sue over again without moving to set it aside. Thus it may
be said that every involuntary nonsuit includes a voluntary nonsui in
so far as a plaintiff can begin a new action.
In some cases the trial court has sustained the plaintiff's motion to
set aside the nonsuit, and when this is done the trial court will order a
new trial. An appeal by the plaintiff is then unnecessary. 4 However,
the Missouri statutes permit either party to appeal from a ruling of a
trial court ordering a new trial.2 5 In those cases where the trial court
sustains plaintiff's motion to set aside a nonsuit, the defendant may elect
to appeal from this ruling rather than to submit to a new trial.2"
Even though the defendant appeals, the plaintiff is assured of a new
-trial, for in the event the appellate court affirms the judgment of the
lower court a new trial will be ordered, 27 while if the appellate court re-verses the judgment of the trial court it will set aside the order for a new
trial and affirnm the judgment of nonsuit. The plaintiff may bring another action for the same cause after the judgment of nonsuit is affirmed
2
on appeal..8
Of course, the plaintiff need not take a nonsuit even though the ruling
of the trial court does prevent him from recovering in that action. He
may choose to permit the proceedings in the lower court to proceed to

22. Wonderly v. Haynes, 159 Mo. App. 122, 139 S. W. 813 (1911) (holding
a nonsuit forced on plaintiff by an adverse ruling of the court is an involuntary
nonsuit).
23. Mason v. Kansas City Belt Ry., 226 Mo. 212, 125 S. W. 1128 (1910);
Thompson v. Farmers Exchange Bk., 333 Mo. 437, 62 S. W. (2d) 803 (1933).
24. State ex rel. Cass County v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 149 Mo. 104, 50 'S. W.
278 (1899); Wonderly v. Haynes, 159 Mo. App. 122, 139 S. W. 813 (1911);
Thaler v. Niedermeyer, 185 Mo. App. 257, 170 S. W. 378 (1914).
25. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 1018, "Any party to a suit aggrieved by any

judgment of any circuit court in any civil cause from which an appeal is not
prohibited by the Constitution, may take his appeal to a court having appellate
jurisdiction from any order granting a new trial, . .
26. Turr v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 277 Mo. 235, 209 S. W. 908 (1919).

However, a defendant cannot appeal from an order of the trial court reinstating
a cause after the plaintiff has taken a voluntary nonsuit, McFarland v. O'Reilly,
272 S.W. 692 (Mo. 1925) ; Segall v. Garlichs, 313 Mo. 406, 281 S.W. 693 (1926);
Holdridge v. Marsh, 28 Mo. App. 283 (1887).
27. State ex rel. Cass County v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 149 Mo. 104, 50 S.W.
278 (1899); Wonderly v. Haynes, 159 Mo. App. 122, 139 S.W. 813 (1911).
28. Woods v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 149 Mo. App. 507, 130 S.W. 1123 (1910);
Woods v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 192 Mo. App. 165, 179 S.W. 727 (1915).
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final judgment, move for a new trial, and, if this is denied, appeal. 29
However, when this course is followed and results in the appellate court
affirming the judgment of the lower court on its ruling, the plaintiff can30
not sue over again. The judgment will then be res adjudicata.
Missouri Statutes Regulating Yonsuits
To understand more fully the Missouri statutes regulating nonsuits,
it is necessary to review briefly nonsuits as they existed at common law.
Before 1400 a plaintiff in England had the right to take a nonsuit even
after general verdict.

In Keat v. Barker,31 it was said ".

.

.

for if

This practice was
he did not like his damages he might be nonsuit."
32
altered in England in 1400 by a statute which provided that a plaintiff
could not be nonsuited after verdict. After the passage of this statute it
became established that a plaintiff could take a nonsuit at any time before
:
a general verdict, but not afterwards. In Price v. Parker," plaintiff
moved for a discontinuance after general verdict. His motion was denied.
The court gave as its reason,

".

new trials as the plaintiff pleases

for that would be having as many
."

However, the practice did

continue of permitting a plaintiff to take a nonsuit after special verdict,
but this was within the discretion of the court, and was permitted only
4
in hard cases2
Nonsuits were regulated by statute in Missouri as early as 1807. The
original statute passed by the territorial legislature provided, "That no
plaintiff shall be permitted to suffer a non-suit after the jury have retired
from the bar to make up their verdict." The present Missouri statute
provides, "The plaintiff shall be allowed to dismiss his suit or take a nonsuit at any time beforc the same is finally submitted to the jury, or to
the court sitting as a jury, or to the court, and not afterwards." Minor
changes from time to time in this statute have not resulted in changes in
its interpretation.33

29. Johnson v. United Railways Co., 227 M,). 423, 127 S. W. 63 (1910);
Johnson v. United Railways Co., 243 Mo. 278, 147 S. W. 1077 (1912).
30. See note 29, supra.
31. 5 Mod. 208 (K. B. 1697).
32. 2 Hen. IV, c. 7 (1400).
33. 1 Salk. 178 (K. B. 1696).
34. Earl of Oxford v. Waterhouse, 1 Cro. Car. 575 (K. B. 1639).
35. The original statute appears in TERR. LAWS OF MISsouRI, p. 123, enacted 1807. The original act was continued in the Revision of 1825; Mo. REV.
STAT. (1825) 632.
The statute was altered in the Revision of 1835; Mo. Rav. STAT. (1835) 464,
"No plaintiff shall suffer a non-suit, after the cause, upon a hearing of the
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The Missouri statute has been held to apply to voluntary as well
as involuntary nonsuits.3Y Does the plaintiff have the right in Missouri
to take a nonsuit, or may the trial court in its discretion refuse to permit
a nonsuit? The courts have interpreted the statute to mean that the
plaintiff does have the right to take a nonsuit.3 7 However, the Supreme
Court of Missouri, in State ex rtel.
Big Bend Quarry Co. v. Wiurdenan,"
held that a plaintiff could not dismiss during term time so as to injuriously affect the rights of the defendant. The court also held that the words
of the statute, shall be allowed to dismiss, indicated that the plaintiff cannot dismiss without an order of court. In Derrington v. Poplar Blilff,3"
the court held that it was necessary for the plaintiff to ask permission
to take a nonsuit during term time in order to ascertain whether he would
meet with opposition of the court if he elected to exercise his statutory
right.4
Again in State ex rel. Hahn Bakery Co. v. Anderson,1 the trial
parties, shall have been finally submitted to a jury, or to the court setting to
try the issue, for their decision." This wording of the statute was continued
in the Revision of 1845, and 1855; Mo. REV. STAT. (1845) 821; MO. REV. STAT.
(1855) 1269.
However, in the revision of 1855 a new section was added, Mo. REv. STAT.
(1855) 1238, "The plaintiff shall be allowed to dismiss his suit, or take a nonsuit, at any time before the same is finally submitted to the jury, or to the
court sitting as-a-jury or, to the court."
The present statute appeared for the first time in 1865, and has remained
unchanged since.then, see Mo. REV. STAT. (1865) 662; Mo. REV. STAT. (1879)
§ 3556; Mo. REV. STAT. (1889) § 2084; MO. REV. STAT. (1909) § 1980; Mo. REV.
STAT. (1919) § 1410; Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 960.

36.

Owens v. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 85 S. W. (2d) 193 (Mo.

App. 1935); McCormack v. Dunn, 232 Mo. App. 371, 106 S. W. (2d)

933

(1937).
37. Lawrence v. Shreve, 26 Mo. 492 (1858); Templeton v. Wolf, 19 Mo.
101 (1853), where a judgment was reversed and remanded for refusal of the
trial court to permit plaintiff to take a nonsuit before his case was finally submitted.
Dunnevant v. Mocksoud, 122 Mo. App. 428, 99 S. W. 515 (1907), defendant
can take a nonsuit on his counterclaim. See also Klaiber v. Jorcke, 239 S. W.
880 (Mo. App. 1922).
Kelly-Goodfellow Shoe Co. v. Prickett, 84 Mo. App. 94 (1900), interpleader
can take involuntary nonsuit as to his interplea.
Plaintiff can take either a voluntary or involuntary nonsuit as to one or
more defendants when their liability is joint and several, Berkson v. Kansas
City Cable Ry.. 144 MNo. 211, 45 S. W. 1119 (1898); Flenner v. Southwest Missouri R. R.. 221 Mlo. App. 160, 290 S.W. 78 (1926); Keyes v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R. R., 326 Mo. 236, 31 S. W. (2d) 50 (1930).
However. in a statutory proceeding to contest a will, it is the duty of
the court to enter judgment either establishing or rejecting the instrument
purporting to be the will, and plaintiff does not have the right to take a
nonsuit. Benoist v. Murrin, 48 Mo. 48 (1871); McMahon v. McMahon, 100
Mo. 97, 13 S. W. 208 (1889).
38. 309 Mo. 341, 274 S. W. 380 (1925).
39. 186 S. W. 561 (Mo. App. 1916).
40. In the case of Stith v. Newberry Co., 336 Mo. 467, 79 S. W. (2d) 447
(1934). the court said, "The taking of a nonsuit is essentially the act of the
plaintiff rather than of the court, which records and gives sanction to the
act."
plaintiff's
41. 269
.31o. 381, 190 S. W. 857 (1916).
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court set aside a verdict for the defendant, ordered a new trial, and
thereafter the plaintiff took a nonsuit. The defendant moved to reinstate the cause to the end that he could appeal from the order granting
a new trial. This motion was denied, and the defendant brought al
action of mandau s, wherein it was held that the right of the plaintiff to
take a nonsuit cannot be exercised so as to deprive the defendant of his
right to appeal from the order granting a new trial. The .ourt said:
"These considerations make it fairly manifest that
we must construe the statute (when invoked after ove' trial and
one successful motion for a new trial in the samne term) as if it
read "provided, such dismissal will not operate to deprive the
defendant of the right to appeal during the term." For surely
when the defendants won before a jury, and the court cut the
victory from under his feet . . . defendants had the right
by a solemn statute to appeal to this court
"
Since 1839, a plaintiff has been permitted by our statutes to dismiss
his suit in vacation upon the payment of all costs that may have accrued
therein. 2 In Atkison v. Dixon, 43 plaintiff had a judgment in the lower
court in an action of ejectment, but on appeal the case was reversed and
remanded with directions to enter judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff thereafter in vacation dismissed his cause, and at the next term the
court refused to reinstate the case. The defendant sued out a writ of
mandamus, State ex rel. Dixon v. Givan,44 to compel the trial judge to
reinstate the case. The court in construing the statute permitting dismissals in vacation held that this statute, comprehensive as it is, was
never designed to enable a plaintiff to evade or balk the mandate of an
appellate court.
A trial court cannot, in its discretion, deny the right of the plaintiff to

42. Mo. SESSION LAWS (1838) 98, reads as follows, "It shall be lawful for
the plaintiff or complainant in any suit at law or in chancery, in any court in
this State, to dismiss his suit in vacation of such court." This enactment was

approved Jan. 14, 1839.

This statute was revised in the year 1845, see Mo. ,REV. STAT. (1845) 832,
which reads as follows, "The plaintiff in any suit at law in any court of record,
may dismiss such suit in the vacation of the oturt, upon the payment of all
costs that may have accrued therein." See also Mo. Rzv ST AT. (1855) 1290,
and Mo. REv. STAT. (1865) 686.
The statute was again revised in the year 1879, see Mo. REv. STAT. (1879)
. 3724, which reads as follows, "The plaintiff in any suit in any court of record may dismiss such suit in the vacation of the court, upon the payment of
all costs that may have accrued therein; and no exhibit or other paper filed
in any case shall be withdrawn without the order of the court, and upon depositing in such court a copy thereof."
No further alterations in the statute have taken place since the revision
of 1879, and that section is now in force. See Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 959.
43. 70 Mo. 381 (1879).
44. 75 Mo. 516 (1882).
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take a nonsuit. However, when a nonsuit is taken during the term time,
it is necessary to apply for and obtain permission of the court, or when
taken during vacation the trial court may ignore the attempt to take a non.
suit when not taken as authorized by statute.' 5 Furthermore, the statutory right of the plaintiff to take a nonsuit must be construed in Ihe
light of existing circumstances, and this right cannot be exercised so as
to affect injuriously the rights of the defendant, to evade the mnandate of
an appellate court, or to deprive the defendant of his right to appeal.
Time For Taking Nonsit
Ut ntil 1835 the Missouri statute on nonsuits provided that a plaintiff
should not be permitted to take a nonsuit, ". . . after the jury have
retired from the bar to make up their verdict." The present statute provides that a plaintiff shall be allowed to dismiss his suit or take a nonsuit,
. .. at any time before the same is finally submitted to the jury, or to
the court sitting as a jury, or to the court, and not afterwards."
The
words, "at any time before the same is finally submitted" were adopted
for the first time in the revision of 1835, and have been continued since."
The words, "and not afterwards" appearing at the end of the present
statute, appeared for- the first-time in the reenactment of the statute in
1875. In Mayer v. Old,4 7 these words were held to have added nothing to
the statute, but were merely intended to emphasize the thought already
expressed.
The question as to how late in the proceedings a plaintiff may take
a nonsuit has been before the appellate courts on numerous occasions.
In Lawrence v. Shreve,4 the court held that when a case is tried by a
jury, it is the uniform construction of this statute to allow a party to get
the opinion of the court upon the law of his case in the form of instructions and then withdraw his suit if that opinion is unfavorable to him.
The court further held that the same opportunity should be afforded the
plaintiff when the ease is tried by the court. In Mayer v. Old,'4 the stat-

45. In Martin v. Richmond Cotton Oil Co., 194 Mo. App. 106, 184 S. W.
127 (1916), the question arose as to whether the defendant could complain when
the plaintiff dismissed during vacation without paying the costs. The court
held that the provision in the statute for the payment of costs was for the
protection of the court and its officers and not for the defendant. But see,
State ex rel. Dixon v. Givan, 75 Mo. 516 (1882).
46. See note 35, supra.
47. 51 Mo. App. 214 (1892).
48. 26 Mo. 492 (1858).
49. 51 Mo. App. 214 (1892).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss2/1
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ute was interpreted, so far as it regulates the time within which the plaintiff may take a nonsuit, as follows:
"The ease is not finally submitted until the evidence is in,
and the instructions (if any offered) are passed on, and then in
the interim between the settling of instructions and final submission to the court or jury, the plaintiff has the undoubted
right to submit to a nonsuit. The rule is the same whether the
ease is being tried by the jury or by the court sitting as a jury."
In Suess v. Motz, 5 " the court held that it was too late to take a nonsuit after the jury had retired. The trial court had permitted the plaintiff to be nonsuited, and the appellate court could not aid the defendant
because the jury had not returned a verdict. Consequently, the court
found it necessary to order a new trial. In Templeton v. lrolfe, 5' the
court held that it was proper to permit the plaintiff to take a nonsuit after
the instructions had been read to the jury, but before the jury had retired.
It is well established that a plaintiff cannot take a nonsuit after verdict or judgment, 52 nor can a verdict or judgment be set aside for the
sole purpose of enabling a plaintiff to take a nonsuit.5 3 However, when
a verdict or judgment is set aside for any other reason and a new trial
54
ordered. a plaintiff may then take a nonsuit
50. 220 Mo. App. 32, 285 S. W. 775 (1926).
51. 19 Mo. 101 (1853).
52. Reed v. Reed, 39 Mo. App. 473 (1890); Thompson v. Wendling, 219
S. W. 671 (Mo. App. 1920); Nordquist v. Armourdale State Bank, 225 Mo.
App. 186, 19 S. W. (2d) 553 (1929). However, in Wood v. Nortman, 85 Mo.
298 (1884), it was held proper to take a nonsuit in an action of ejectment where
the judgment had been prempturely entered.
In Klaiber v. Jorcke, 239 S. W. 880 (Mo. App. 1922), plaintiff sued to enjoin a foreclosure sale. Defc.-dant filed a cross bill for foreclosure. Defendant
had judgment on both the petition and cross bill. On the same day the trial
court entered an order that the defendant waives his right to judgment of
the cross bill, and same is dismissed without prejudice. The court on appeal
held that the statute was not intended to prevent a successful party from waiving by dismissal the benefit of a favorable judgment which the court has announced it will enter.
In Stauffer v. Stauffer, 200 Mo. App. 477, 207 S. W. 240 (1918), the court
dismissed plaintiff's divorce action because plaintiff was not the innocent party.
Thereafter, the court amended the judgment to read, "dismrissal -without prejudice." The court on appeal held the amendmert aao:,roed to a noniuit, and
.
the court had no power to permit a nonsuit aft- iudg
It was held, in Allen v. Hickam, 156 Mo. 49, 56 S. XV.309 (1i900), to be
too late to take a nonsuit after the court had refused to set aside the report of
arbitrators. In Ivory v. Delore, 26 Mo. 505 (1858), the court held that plaintiff may take a nonsuit after the report of the commissioners, but before approval of the commissioners' report.
53. Lawyers' Co-op. Publishing Co. v. Gordon, 173 Mo. 139, 73 S. W.
155 (1903); Thompson v. Wendling, 219 S. W. 671 (Mo. App. 1920).
54. State ex rel. Hahn Bakery Co. v. Anderson, 269 Mo. 381, 190 S. W.
857 (1916), but a nonsuit taken after a new trial is ordered cannot be taken
before the time allowed defendant to appeal so as to deprive him of his right to
appeal.by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940
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Several cases have appeared before the appellate courts in which the
case has been submitted to either the court or to the jury, and then withdrawn in order to enable either party to present additional declarations
of law. In these cases the plaintiff took a nonsuit before the case was
again submitted. The Missouri statute provides that the plaintiff may
take a nonsuit at any time before the case is finally submitted. What
constitutes final submission is the question in these cases.
In Hensley & Wright v. Peck & Barnett,5 the jury, after deliberating
one evening, informed the court that they could not agree, whereupon
the court gave the jury a new set of instructions. The plaintiff took a
nonsuit before the jury again retired. On appeal the court held the nonsuit was properly granted. In Wilson & Co. v. Stark," it was held proper
to permit a plaintiff to take a nonsuit in an action at law tried before the
court sitting as a jury where the judge withheld the announcement of
his verdict in order to permit the plaintiff to file declarations of law, some
of which were refused. The plaintiff at that time took a nonsuit. However,
in McCauley v. Brown,5; the trial court refused to permit a nonsuit after
the jury had deliberated for a day, and the trial judge then instructed
them that any nine of them could return a verdict. The appellate court
in- affirming the ruling of the lower court held that when an instruction,
though merely formal, is given after a case has been once submitted, and
involves or affects some issue in the cause, or might affect the mind of
the jury in arriving at conclusions on any of the issues submitted to
them, there might then be reason for holding the case is not finally submitted until then. In National Bank of Commerce v. Butler5 it was held
proper to permit a plaintiff to take a nonsuit, after a motion to set aside
submission of the case has been sustained in order to permit the plaintiff to
introduce additional evidence.
In several cases tried before the court sitting as a jury, or before the
court in equity proceedings, the trial judge has announced his verdict
or judgment at the same time as he has announced which instructions or
declarations of law were accepted and refused. The Missouri appellate
courts have held that a plaintiff has the right to have an opportunity to
take a nonsuit even after the court has ruled on the declarations of law
presented by the parties. It is error for the trial court to announce the

55. 13 Mo. 587 <1850).
56. 42 Mo. App. 376 (1890).
57. 99 Mo. App. 625, 74 S. W. 464 (1903).
58. 163 Mo. App. 380, 143 S. W. 1117 (1912).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss2/1
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verdict or judgment of the court at the same time at which it announces
its rulings on the declarations of law tendered by the parties so as to
deprive the plaintiff of his opportunity of taking a nonsuit after he has
heard the ruling of the court oi the declarations of law23
Effect of Counterclaim on Plaintiff's Right to Take Nonsuit
Before 1889 a dismissal or nonsuit taken by a plaintiff also resilted
in the dismissal of defendant's counterclaim or set-off.O The legislat lire
remedied this situation in that year by expressly providing that "the
dismissal or any other discontinuance of plaintiff's action, in whie;h sm-h
set-off or counterclaim shall have been filed, shall not operate to dismiss
5
or discontinue such set-off or counterclaim. . .," In Lanyon v. (!h
,Sney,1:-' the question arose as to whether this statute prevented the plaintiff
from taking a nonsuit after a counterclaim had been filed. The court held
that prior to the revision of 1889 the defendant could not have proceeded
with his counterclaim if the plaintiff took a nonsuit, but in order to
remedy this injustice to the defendant a new section had been added to
the statute. This new section was not intended to limit the right of the
plaintiff to take a nonsuit, but merely to permit the defendant to proceed
with his counterclaim after the plaintiff had dismissed.e 3

59. Piatt v. Heim & Overly Realty Co., 342 Mo. 772, 117 S. W. (2d) 327
(1938); Lawrence v. Shreve, 26 Mo.
492 (1858).
60. Nordmanser v. Hitchcoe '-, 40 Mo. 178 (1867) (counterclaim); Fink v.
Bruihl, 47 Mo. 173 (1870) (set-off); Martin v. McLean, 49 Mo. 361 (1872).
61. Mo. Ruv. STAT. (1889) § 8172. This section of the statute is still in
effect in its original form, and appears in Mo. Ruv. STAT. (1929) § 849, which
reads as follows: "Whenever a set-off or counterclaim shall be filed in an
action, as provided in this article, it shall be deemed in law and treated as
an independent action begun by the defendant against the plaintiff, except in
the cases enumerated in section 838 of this article; and, the dismissal or any
other discontinuance of the plaintiff's action, in which such set-off or counterclaim shall have been filed, shall not operate to dismiss or discontinue such setoff or counterclaim, but the defendant so filing such set-off or counterclaim may,
notwithstanding such discontinuance or dismissal of the plaintiff's action,
prosecute the same against the plaintiff in the za,, nianner and w-ith the
same force and effect as if he had originally beguz, the ,ic;:, on his set-off or
counterclaim against the plaintiff; and, in such case, the defendant so prosecuting such set-off or counterclaim shall be subject to all the rules applicable to
plaintiffs in civil actions and other procedure, and the set-off or counterclaim
shall be proceeded with, in all respects, as if the action had been originally been
begun by the defendant against the plaintiff."
62. 209 Mo. 1, 106 S. W. 522 (1907).
63. Defendant has the right to take a nonsuit under this statute as to his
counterclaim, set-off, or interplea, Dunnevant v. Mocksoud, 122 Mo. App. 428,
99 S.W. 515 (1907) (counterclaim) ; Klaiber v. Jorcke, 239 S.W. 880 (Mo. App.
1922) (counterclaim); Kelly-Goodfellow Shoe Co. v. Prickett, 84 Mo. App.
94 (1900) (interplea).
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Invohntary Nonsuij in Missour.
The right of a plaintiff to appeal from a judgment of nonsuit in a
proceeding at law was recognized as carly as 1827 in Missouri.4 The
contrary was true of proceedings in equity and it was not until 1889 that
a plaintiff could appeal from a judgment of nonsuit in an equity proceeding even though his nonsuit was taken as the result of an adverse ruling
of the trial court which prevented a substantial recovery.
In Sachse
v. Clingingsmith," the Supreme Court of Missouri expressly overruled its
former decisions by holding that an appeal would lie in an equity suit
where the plaintiff had taken a nonsuit after an adverse ruling which
prevented a recovery on his part. The court said:
"A non-suit with leave is not, strictly speaking, an appropriate mode to secure a review of exceptions in a suit of this nature. Indeed, it has been expressly ruled that it cannot be
resorted to. Gill v. Clark, 54 Mo. 415. But a majority of the
court are adverse to adhering to that ruling. The distinction it
makes is regarded as of form rather than of substance and one
that should now be abandoned. It is thought best to treat all
civil actions alike in this regard."
Since Sachse v. Clingingsmith, no distinction has been made between actions at law and suits in equity in so far as the right of the plaintiff to
appeal from a judgment of nonsuit is concerned.
It should be pointed out that an appeal will not lie from all judgments
of nonsuit taken by plaintiff, but only in those cases where the nonsuit

64. English v. Mullanphy, 1 Mo. 780 (1827).
65. In Gill v. Clark, 54 Mo. 415 (1873), it was said, "But the plaintiff
did not let the court pass upon the case so as to bring it before us for review.
In equitable suits no declarations of law can be made, and if made, will be
disregarded in this court.
"The plaintiff by taking a non-suit, in effect, voluntarily dismisses his petition without prejudice. A non-suit with leave to move to set it aside can only
be taken in a case at law so as to bring before us the question of law and fact
passed on by the court. In suits in equity, the court below must be allowed to

adjudicate on the facts and law so as to authorize us to pass upon them on
appeal or writ of error.

"And in such suits this court will examine into all the evidence, and decide
the case according to the preponderance of testimony and the law arising
thereon."
In Conn v. Ferree, 60 Mo. 17 (1875), the court held plaintiff'9 appeal from
a judgment of nonsuit premature, but said, "It is also doubtful whether a nonsuit with leave to set the same aside can be taken on a suit in equity so as
to bring the case before this court to be reviewed."
But see, Schulter's Adm'r v. Bockwinkle's Adm'r, 19 Mo. 647 (1854), in

which the court held plaintiff could not appeal after taking a voluntary nonsuit in an equity proceeding, but that had the nonsuit been taken as the result of an adverse ruling which precluded a recovery, an appeal could have been
had.
66.

97 Mo. 406, 11 S. W. 69 (1888).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss2/1

12

Heitz: Heitz: Voluntary and Involuntary Non-Suites

19J401

NOXSUITS iN MI88OURI

is taken by the plaintiff as the result of an adverse ruling of the' trial
court.'1 7 In addition, the adverse ruling of tile trial court must preclude
the plaintiff from a substantial recovery.'

Nonsuits taken by the plain-

tiff, but not as the result of an adverse ruling are voluntary and no appeal
lies as to them.

9

Even though the plaintiff takes his nonsuit as the result

of an adverse ruling it will, nevertheless, be regarded as voluntary unless
the adverse ruling is regarded as precluding a substantial recovery on
his part.

Merely calling a nonsuit "involuntary"

What is an adverse ruling?

will not make it so."

A nonsuit taken after the trial judge

has indicated that he will rule against the plaintiff, but before he actually
rules, is a voluntary nonsuit.

In Graham v. Parsons,7

the trial judge

indicated that he would give a peremptory instruction for the defendant,
but before he actually gave the instruction the plaintiff took a nonsuit.
On appeal it was held that this was not an adverse ruling for there was
time and opportunity for the trial court to have changed its opinion before it made a formal ruling, and it might have done so, had not the
plaintiff deprived it of that opportunity by taking a nonsuit.

The court

further held the nonsuit taken was voluntary, and that nonsuits were

67. Gray v. Ward, 234 Mo. 291, 136 S. W. 405 (1911); Hogan-Sunkel
Heating Co. v. Bradley, 320 Mo. 185, 7 S. W. (2d) 255 (1928); Kane v. Kaysing Iron Works, 89 S. W. (2d) 532 (Mo. App. 1936).
In addition to the requirement that there be an adverse ruling, the court
in Adamson v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 126 Mo. App. 127, 103 S. W. 1097 (1907),
held the plaintiff must also take an exception to the ruling. The court said,
"But even if it could be suggested that there was an adverse ruling in this
case, as there must be in order to make an involuntary nonsuit, yet there was
no exception taken to such supposed ruling and therefore plaintiff must be
regarded as acquiescing in 'he ruling and his subsequent nonsuit must be regarded as voluntary."
But see Thaler v. Niedermeyer, 185 Mo. App. 257, 170 S. W. 378 (1914),
which is contra to the Adamson Metropolitan St. Ry. case. In the Thaler case
the court said, "We think that the absence of an exception, under the circumstances, cannot affect plaintiff's case before us; nor do we perceive how it
could have the effect of turning the involuntary nonsuit into a voluntary one,
though it would have precluded plaintiff from having the court's action reviewed
here had the nonsuit not been set aside and had plaintiff appealed-for the absurd rule of appellate practice still prevails th4t, no matter how much one
may object below, or how plain it may be tbat h- dfe ; not assent to or acquiesce in a ruling which his counsel has used avery n-eanr. -ethin bis power to
prevent, nevertheless if the record does not snow an. e.cp.;.,n' :,aved xo the
court's action, and this too in the proper place in the record, to-wit, the bill of
exceptions, he may not complain of the ruling on appeal."
The Thaler case seems to be the better reasoned case because in Missouri
a court may order a new trial even though no exception was taken. See, Green
v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 211 Mo. 18, 109 S. W. 715 (1908); Heitland Grate &
Mantel Co. v. Culver, 181 Mo. App. 691, 164 S. W. 708 (1914).
68. See note 13, supra.
69. See note 21, &upra.
70. Owens v. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 85 S. W. (2d) 193 (Mo.
App. 1935).
71.University
88 Mo.ofApp.
385School
(1901).
Published by
Missouri
of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1940], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

voluntary unless the court's action is such as to preclude the plaintiff
from a recovery. The same result was reached by the Supreme Court in
Segall v. Garlichs,7 2 decided in 1926.
Considerable confusion has existed in those cases in which the plaintiff has taken a nonsuit after the trial judge has mharked a peremptory
3
The Misinstruction as "given" and before it was read to the jury.
souri statutes require the trial judge to give or refuse instructions presented in writing by either party.7" Until recently there was some
confusion as to whether an instruction marked "given" was a ruling of
the court, or whether an instruction was given only when read to the
jury. However, both divisions of the Supreme Court in 1936, in Boonville
National Bank v. Thonzpson 6 and Arp v. Rogers,7 held that an instruction when marked "given" was a ruling of the court, and a nonsuit taken
at that time was taken as the result of an adverse ruling. These two
cases should eliminate the confusion which formerly existed in this regard.
*What adverse rulings of the trial court prcelude the plaintiff from a
substantial recovery? The early Missouri cases permitted a plaintiff to
appeal from any adverse ruling of the trial court after he had taken a
nonsuit. It was not at first necessary that the adverse ruling prevtent or
preclnde a slbstantial recovery.77 It was not until 1854 that the right

72.

313 Mo. 406, 281 S. W. 693 (1926).

73. McClure v. Campbell, 148 Mo. 96, 49 S. W 881 (1899); Lewis v.
Center Creek Mining Co., 199 Mo. 463, 97 S. W. 938 (1906); Carter v. O'Neill,
102 Mo. App. 391, 76 S. W. 717 (1903); Stephenson v. American National Ins.
Co., 229 Mo. App. 480, 78 S. W. (2d) 876 (1935).
74. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 967, "When the evidence is concluded, and
before the case is argued or submitted to the jury or to the court sitting as a
jury, either party may move the court to give instructions on any point of law
arising
75.
76.
77.
witness

in the cause, which shall be in writing and shall be given or refused."
339 Mo. 1049, 99 S. W. (2d) 93 (1936).
99 S. W. (2d) ¢103 (Mo. 1936). See note (1937) 2 Mo. L. REV. 253.
In English v. Mullanphy, 1 Mo. 780 (1827), a regularly subpoenaed
of the plaintiff failed to appear, and the plaintiff applied for and ob-

tained an attachment returnable to the next term. The plaintiff also asked for
a continuance on the ground the witness was material for plaintiff's cause. A
continuance was denied, whereupon plaintiff took a nonsuit. The plaintiff,
after first unsuccessfully moving to set the nonsuit aside, sued out a writ of
error. The supreme court reviewed the lower court's decision although there
was no showing that the witness could not have been attached to the next term.
See also Collins v. Bowmer, 2 Mo. 195 (1830).
In Howell v. Pitman, 5 Mo. 246 (1838), the plaintiff took a nonsuit after a

survey of land he had introduced in evidence was rejected. The plaintiff appealed without first moving to set aside the nonsuit, and the court held his
appeal would not lie for this reason. The court also held that it would have
reviewed the decision of the lower court had the plaintiff first moved to set aside
the nonsuit in the lower court, although no showing was made that the plaintiff
could not have obtained a less objectionable survey of the land.

In Dame v. Broadwater, 9 Mo. 19 (1845), it was held that a writ of error
would lie after a nonsuit was taken as the result of a refusal of the trial court 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss2/1
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of the plaintiff to take a nonsuit and appeal was restricted to cases where
the adverse ruling of the court prevented a recovery by the plaintiff.
In Schadter's Adm r v. Boclwinkle's Adm'r,7 Judge Gamble, in expressing this restriction, said:
"This court has entertainied jiirisdiction in cases where the
Circuit Courts have, upon the trial of causes, decided questions
which covered the plaintiff's ease and obliged him to submit
to a non-suit. But when parties voluntarily suffer non-suits, we
do not interfere. If it was allowed to plaintiffs to take non-suits
on every motion they might make and which the court might
overrule, and then bring the case here to test the correctness of
the decision upon the motion. this court would be filled with
cases, in all different stages of progress, and every question of
practice might be brought here to be settled before the merits of
the case were reached. Although the court refused to give judgment on the answer, on the motion made by the plaintiff, there
was still to be a hearing of the cause, and until that hearing,
there could be no decision by which the plaintiff was obliged to
take a non-suit."
Judge Ryland, in Duimey v.Schoeffler,;9 expressed the limitation on
plaintiff's right to obtain a review on appeal of an adverse ruling of the
trial court after plaintiff has taken a nonsuit in this manner:
"Here a motion was made by plaintiff to strike out a part of
the defendant's answer. This motion was overruled, and thereupon the plaintiff takes voluntarily a non-suit. He was not
compelled to this course: he could have had the decision of the
court upon the legal effect of that part of the answer, upon asking proper instructions. His case was not decided by the court
below upon this motion to strike out, and we will not suffer
the parties to come here upon every motion which is overruled or
sustained followed by a voluntary non-suit."
In Hagenzan v. Moreland,"o Judge Dryden expressed the distinction
between voluntary and involuntary nonsuits in these words:
"In the present posture of the case, we can give no opinion
upon the merits. The plaintiff was under no necessity to take a
nonsuit. The court has made no decision which necessarily precludes him from a recovery, for if it be admitted that the answer
which the court refused to strike out presented a complete bar
to the action, yet it by no means follows that the defendant could
or would have sustained the same by proof on the trial of the

to grant a continuance asked for on the ground that a witness material to plaintiff's cause was not present, and that the facts expected to be proved by this
witness could not be proved by any other witness. No reason was given why
the witness could not be attached forthwith.
78. 19 Mo. 647 (1854). See also McDermott v. Doyle, 11 Mo. 443 (1848).
79. 20 Mo. 323 (1855). See also Louisiana & Middletown Plank Road Co.
v. Mitchell, 20 Mo. 432 (1855).
80. 33 Mo. 86 (1862). See also Layton v. Riney, 33 Mo. 87 (1862).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940
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cause. If he had not, the answer could have done tile plaintiff
no harm.
"It is only where the action of the ,mrt, on tile trial, is such
as to preclude the plaintiff from a re.ovry that it is proper to
suffer a nonsuit."
The most frequent use of the procedural device called "involuntary
nonsuit" has been in those cases in which the trial court has given a
peremptory instruction for the defendant. It is well established that
a peremptory instruction given for the defendant at either the close of
plaintiff's evidence,"' or at the close of all the evidence,," is an adverse
ruling of the trial court which precludes the plaintiff from a substantial
recovery. A nonsuit taken as the result of such ruling is an involuntary
nonsuit from which the plaintiff may appeal.
Several cases have been considered by the Missouri appellate courts
in which the plaintiff has taken a nonsuit after the trial court has ruled
that his petition did not state a cause of action. A nonsuit taken as the
result of such a ruling is an involuntary nonsuit. In State ex rel. Cass
County i. Missouri Pac. Ry., 8' an action was brought against the railroad for a penalty as provided for by statute. The trial court refused"
to permit the plaintiff to introduce evidence to show that the defendant
operated, the railroad on the ground that the penalty was against the
owner of the railroad, and not the operator. In addition the court permitted the defendant to introduce evidence tending to show that it was
not the owner of the railroad. On appeal, the court held the nonsuit
taken by plaintiff after these rulings was involuntary, ruled the evidence
was admissible, and ordered a new trial.
In Ready v. Smith,8 ' the trial court refused to receive any of plaintiff's evidence on the ground that he was not the proper party to sue.
Plaintiff had sued to recover money alleged to have been embezzled from
plaintiff's debtor. On appeal the court held the nonsuit taken after the

81. Segall v. Garlichs, 313 Mo. 406, 281 S. W. 693 (1926); Hogan-Sunkel
Heating Co. v. Bradley, 320 Mo. 185, 7 S. W. (2d) 255 (1928); Trabue v.
United Railways Co., 154 Mo. App. 86, 133 S. W. 102 (1910); Armstrong v.
Dunn, 180 Mo. App. 123, 167 S. W. 1197 (1914); Bank of Rockville v. Corbin,
276 S.W. 880 (Mo. App. 1925).
82. Gray v. Ward, 234 Mo. 291, 136 S. W. 405 (1911); Bonanomi v. Purcell, 287 Mo. 436, 230 S. W. 120 (1921); Stith v. Newberry Co., 336 Mo. 467, 79
S. W. (2d) 447 (1934); Boonville Nat. Bank v. Thompson, 339 Mo. 1049, 99 S.
W. (2d) 93 (1936); Arp v. Rogers, 99 S. W. (2d) 103 (Mo. 1936); Kelly-Goodfellow Shoe Co. v. Prickett, 84 Mo. App. 94 (1900); Leesley Bros. v. Rebori
Fruit Co., 162 Mo. App. 195, 144 S.W. 138 (1912); Arky v. Swift & Co., 270 S.
W. 438 (Mo. App. 1925).
83. 149 Mo. 104, 50 S. W. 278 (1899).
84. 141 Mo. 305, 42 S. W. 727 (1897).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss2/1

16

Heitz: Heitz: Voluntary and Involuntary Non-Suites

1940]

NONSUITS IN MISSOURI

court had refused to receive any evidence was involuntary. In Nivert
v. Wabash I. R.,"5 the plaintiff took a nonsuit after the trial court refused
to receive any evidence because plaintiff's petition failed to state a cause
of action. The Supreme Court on appeal held this was an involuntary
nonsuit.
In those cases in which there is more than one count in plaintiff's
petition a different problem is presented. In Schneider v. Kirkpatrick,6
plaintiff's petition contained three counts, one in equity and two at law.
The court required the plaintiff to elect on which count he would proceed
to trial. He elected to proceed on the law counts, and as to these the
defendant's request for a peremptory instruction was granted. The
plaintiff then took a nonsuit. On appeal, the court held the nonsuit was
voluntary since the plaintiff was still entitled to a hearing on the equity
count. In Wonderly v. Haynes,8 7 the trial court, believing that the
two counts of plaintiff's petition were inconsistent and that they could
not be pursued at the same time, required him to elect upon which count
lie would stand. Plaintiff elected to stand on the first count and took a
nonsuit as to the second count. The defendant had judgment on the
first count. The plaintiff successfully moved for a new trial on the second
count, and the defendant appealed. After the plaintiff took a nonsuit in
Wonderly v. Haynes as to the second count of his petition he could and
did proceed to trial on the first count. There was no reason existing at
that time to prevent him from recovering on the first count. The nonsuit
should have been regarded as voluntary. The court would have reached
that conclusion had it followed Schneider v. Kirkpatrick. It is submitted
that the theory of Schneider v. Kirkpatrick that a ruling of a trial court
which prevents a recovery on one or more counts of plaintiff's petition, but
which leaves other counts of his petition undisposed of, is not a rul-

85. 232 Mo. 626, 135 S. W. 33 (1911).
86. 72 Mo. App. 103 (1897). The court said, "The plaintiff did not suffer
a nonsuit on the law counts of his petition but suffered it as to the whole case
and from the judgment of nonsuit has appealed. If he had suffered a nonsuit
as to the law counts and then proceeded to trial on the equity count and had
a final decree entered therein, or if he had dismissed the equity count and then
suffered a nonsuit as to the law counts, there would have been a final disposition
of the entire case from which an appeal would lie . . . As long as the
equity count had not been stricken out or otherwise disposed of he was not
'at the end of his row' for he still was entitled to a trial on that. The rule is
well settled in this state that if anything substantial is left in a case on which
a party can stand he must proceed to final hearing of the whole."
87. 159 Mo. App. 122, 139 S. W. 813 (1911). The court said, "While it is
stated that the non-suit was voluntary as to the second count, it is evident that
that is not a fact; it was a non-suit forced on plaintiff by the adverse ruling of
the court, compelling him to elect, to which ruling exception was duly saved."
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ing which will prevent a recovery by plaintiff, is the better view. This case
and Wonderly v. Haynes also illustrate the established rule that an appeal cannot be had until the whole case is disposed of in the lower court.
Where the plaintiff takes a nonsuit as the result of a refusal by the
trial court to strike out the defendant's answer, his nonsuit is voluntary,
and he cannot appeal. In Hageman v. Moreland," the trial court refused
to strike out defendant's answer on motion of the plaintiff. On appeal a
nonsuit taken by plaintiff as a result of this ruling was held voluntary.
The court pointed out that even though the answer was a complete bar
to plaintiff's petition, still there was no showing that the defendant would
or could sustain his burden of proof, and the plaintiff might have recovered
had he not taken a nonsuit. In Wonderly v. Haynes, the court would
have held the nonsuit voluntary had it followed the theory of the court in
Hageman v,.
Moreland.
The cases are not in accord as to what rulings of the trial court preclude the plaintiff from a substantial recovery where the plaintiff has
taken a nonsuit after the trial court excludes evidence offered by the
plaintiff, or where the trial court rejects testimony of one or more of
plaintiff's witnesses. The early case of Howell v. Pitman9 held that in
an action of ejectment a wrrit of error would lie after the plaintiff took a
nonsuit after the trial court excluded a survey of the land offered in evidence by the plaintiff. No showing was made by the plaintiff that he
could not have obtained another survey of the land which the court would
have received in evidence.
Twenty-four years later, in Layton v. Riney," the testimony of two
of plaintiff's witnesses was excluded, whereupon the plaintiff took a nonsuit.
On appeal the court said:
"It is only where the ruling of the court is such as strikes
at the root of the case and precludes the plaintiff from a re88. 33 Mo. 86 (1862). See also Louisiana & Middletown Plank Road Co.
v. Mitchell, 20 Mo. 432 (1855); Koger v. Hays, 57 Mo. 329 (1874). In Dumey

v. Schoeffler, 20 Mo. 323 (1855), Judge Ryland gives this additional reason why
the plaintiff was not forced to take a nonsuit on a set of facts identical to that
in the Hageman case, "Here a motion was made by plaintiff to strike out a
part of the defendant's answer. This motion was overruled, and thereupon the
plaintiff takes voluntarily a non-suit. He was not compelled to this course:
he could have had the decision of the court upon the legal effect of that part
of the answer, upon asking proper instructions. His case was not decided by
the court below upon his motion to strike out, and we will not suffer the parties
to come here upon every motion which is overruled or sustained followed by
a voluntary non-suit."
89. 5 Mo. 246 (1838).
90.

33 Mo. 87 (1862).

See also Kennedy v. Ballard, 39 Mo. App. 340

(1890).
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covery that he will undertake to review the action of the court
below after a voluntary nonsuit. A contrary practice would encourage parties to appeal upon every trivial decision of the court
and thus keep the matter in controversy in endless litigation."
The witnesses whose testimony was rejected were to testify in regard to
undue influence practiced upon the testator. No showing was made in
either the trial court or the appellate court that the plaintiff could not
have secured other witnesses who could testify to the same facts.
In Yankee v. Thompson,9 the trial court in an action of ejectment
excluded a tax deed relied upon by the plaintiff in his chain of title. The
defendant had pleaded the general issue. This exclusion was held on
appeal to preclude a recovery on the part of the plaintiff. In Yankee v.
Thonipson it is apparent without an additional showing that the plaintiff
could not recover unless his tax deed was permitted to be introduced in
evidence, whereas this was not true in Layton v. Riney and Howell v.
Pitman. In these latter cases it would have been necessary for the plaintiff to show that he could not prove the matters sought to be proved in
some other manner. No such showing was made in Layton v. Riney, and
consequently the court held the nonsuit was voluntary. Howell v. Pitman
did not require that there be a showing by the plaintiff that he could not
recover without the evidence offered, and to that extent is in conflict with
the Layton case. Howell v. Pitman was decided in 1838. This was before
the Missouri courts clearly defined the limits of plaintiff's right to appeal
after a nonsuit. Consequently this case cannot be considered as representing the rule in Missouri today. At least the result reached in Layton
v. Rinty is more desirable.
The next important case to come before the Supreme Court was
State ex rel. Meramee Iron Co. v. Gaddy.2 In this case the court in holding the nonsuit voluntary said:
"In respect to the evidence offered through the witness
Smith, there is nothing to show that this was the only source of

91. 51 Mo. 234 (1873). A similar situation was presented in Roeder v.
Shryock, 61 Mo. App. 485 (1895). Here plaintiff sued as assignor of a dissolved firm of attorneys for legal services rendered defendant. The trial court
excluded the dissolution agreement offered in evidence to prove the assignment.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals held a nonsuit taken as the result of this ruling
involuntary.
In Sachse v. Clingingsmith, 97 Mo. 406, 11 S. W. 69 (1888), the plaintiff
sued to set aside a -deed as fraudulent. The answer of the defendant was
a general denial, and a plea of a prior existing equity good against plaintiff's
legal title. At the trial the court excluded all documentary evidence of plaintiff's offered to show his legal title. A nonsuit taken as a result of this ruling
was held involuntary.
92. 83 Mo. 138 (1884).
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evidence open and available to the plaintiff to establish Me l'act
sought. Onl the contrary it was disclosed that there were other
witnesses, as also book entries and accounts kept, from whom and
by which the amount of such coal might very properly and easily
have been shown and exhibited to the triers of the fact."
In this case the plaintiff's own testimony showed that the fa' sou' itto
be proved could have been proved with testimony and book entries other
than that which had been offered by the plaintiff and rejected by the
trial court.
Subsequently in Pettis County v. DeBold,°1 the plaintiff, the wife of
a drunkard, brought a statutory action against a dramnshop keeper and
his sureties on their bond for furnishing intoxicating drinks to her husband. The only issue presented was whether the defendant had supplied
the plaintiff's husband with drinks after receiving a statutory notice not
to do so. In order to prove this issue, plaintiff offered the deposition of
her husband which was excluded by the trial court on the ground that
he was an interested party. The plaintiff excepted to this ruling and
stated, ". . . we have no further evidence at hand by which we can
prove that the defendant sold liquor to the plaintiff's husband." Defendant suggested that they use Mr. Moss, another witness, but plaintiff replied. "He would not testify so as to support the action, and she is unable
to proceed further and would take a nonsuit." On appeal this was held
to be an involuntary nonsuit. The court further held the evidence was
improperly rejected and ordered a new trial.
Pettis County v. DeBold is in conflict with Layton v. Rincy, Yankee
r. Thompson and State ex rel. Meramee Iron Co. v. Gaddy. The
test devised in the latter of these cases was not whether a plaintiff had
any other witnesses or evidence immediately accessible, but whether the
facts sought to be proved by the witness or evidence rejected could have
been proved in any other manner. In the DeBold case the only reason
the plaintiff could not proceed with his case was his own negligence in
failing to provide himself with witnesses which the trial court thought
competent. In any event the rule applied in the Meramec Iron Co. ease
is much to be preferred.
A different problem was presented in Gentry County v. Black "
Scat,-' an action on a bond. The answer admitted the bond, but denied

93. 136 Mo. App. 265, 117 S. W. 88 (1909).
94. 32 Mo. 542 (1862).

In Williams v. Finks, 156 Mo. 597, 57 S. W. 732 (1900), plaintiff sued on

a promissory note. The answer admitted the execution of the note.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss2/1
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the happening of the condition. The plaintiff took a nonsuit after the
court excluded the bond offered in evidence by the plaintiff. On appeal
the court held the nonsuit taken was voluntary because the plaintiff could
recover without introducing the bond in evidence. The effect of this
case is that where plaintiff takes a nonsuit after the trial court has excluded evidence which is not necessary or relevant to plaintiff's case, the
95
nonsuit is voluntary
The majority of cases in which a plaintiff has taken a nonsuit as the
result of rulings of the trial court on instructions have been in cases
where the trial court has given a peremptory instruction for the defendant at either the close of plaintiff's evidence, or at the close of all the
evidence. These cases have been previously discussed.; There have been
cases in which a plaintiff has taken a nonsuit after the trial court has given
or refused instructions other than a peremptory instruction for the defendant.
In International Harvester Co. v. MeLaughlin,9 7 plaintiff requested
a peremptory instruction which the court refused to give, whereupon he
took a nonsuit. On appeal the court held the nonsuit voluntary because
it did not preclude the plaintiff from a recovery. He could have proceeded
by offering instructions on the merits and perhaps obtain a verdict in
his favor. In answer to this the plaintiff contended, and the appellate
court agreed with him, that had he proceeded with the trial in the lower
court and lost, he would have waived his right to a review on appeal of
the ruling of the lower court. In Missouri a plaintiff, by offering instructions on the merits, waives his right to complain of a ruling of the
trial court refusing to give a peremptory instruction for the plaintiff.
Overall v. Ellis9 s presents another problem. In this case two issues
of fact were in dispute. The plaintiff could not recover unless the jury

refused to receive the note in evidence. The Supreme Court of Missouri held
a nonsuit taken by plaintiff as a result of this ruling was voluntary for the
reason that the plaintiff could recover without the note being admitted in evidence.
95. For cases dealing with the situation where the trial court has refused
to receive any evidence because the petition does not state a cause of action see
notes 83-85 inclusive.
96. Pages 146, 147.
97. 227 Mo. App. 221, 52 S. W. (2d) 227 (1932). For cases in which the
plaintiff was held to have waived his right to a review on appeal of the trial
court's ruling refusing to give a peremptory instruction for the plaintiff by
submitting instructions on the merits see: Everhart v. Bryson, 244 Mo. 507,
149 S. W. 307 (1912); Kincaid v. Estes, 218 Mo. App. 109, 262 S. W. 399
(1924) ; Fawkes v. National Refining Co., 341 Mo. 630, 108 S. W. (2d) 7 (1937).
98. 32 Mo. 322 (1862).
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found both in his favor. The trial judge directed the jury to find for the
defendant as to one issue and gave the case to the jury with proper
instructions as to the other issue whereupon a nonsuit was taken. Oil
appeal the nonsuit -was held involuntary since the plaintiff could not recover on the instructions given.
In Rainey v. Edmonson,99 the trial court instructed the jury that the
burden of proof was on the plaintiff. The court also informed the jury
that the defendant's answer admitted the allegation of title in plaintiff's
petition. The plaintiff then took a nonsuit. On appeal it was held that
there was nothing in the issues or the evidence to justify the giving of the
former instruction, yet the giving of the instruction could do the plaintiff no harm. There was no reason why the plaintiff could not have recovered had he permitted the case to go to the jury. Therefore the
nonsuit was volunta-.
In Martin v. Fewell, 00 the trial court gave one set of instructions
which permitted a recovery by the plaintiff as well as other instructions
which contradicted these. After taking a nonsuit the plaintiff appealed.
On appeal it was held that the contradictory instructions neutralized each
other and prevented a recovery. Therefore the nonsuit was involuntary.
This ease is contra to the result reached in Rainey v. Edmonson. In
Martin v. Feiwell, the jury could not have followed both sets of instructions, but they may have followed those instructions favorable to the plaintiff. and had they done so, the plaintiff could have recovered.
In Netzow Manufacturing Co. v. Baker,'0 it was held a nonsuit taken
by plaintiff after the trial court had refused instructions offered by plaintiff. but had given instructions of its own by which he could recover
substantial damages was a voluntary nonsuit. The court took the position
that this would be so even though the instructions offered by the plaintiff
were correct, and those given by the court were erroneous.
An interesting problem was presented in State ex rel. Mackey v,.
Tompson. 02 At the close of the evidence the trial court ruled there could
be no recovery against Keating's estate, and only nominal damages could
be recovered against the other defendants. After these rulings plaintiff

99. 33 Mo. 375 (1863).
100. 79 Mo. 401 (1883).
101. 137 2%o. App. 670 (1909). See also Loring v. Cooke, 60 Mo. 564 (1875),
in which a nonsuit taken by the plaintiff was held voluntary where the trial
court refused to give instructions which entitled plaintiff to substantial daniages.
!02. 81 Mo. App. 549 (1899).
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took a nonsuit. On appeal it was held that no substantial cause of action
was left after the trial court had given such instructions. Hence the
nonsuit was involuntary.
With the Thompson case compare Meramee Iron Co. v. Gaddy.103
Here the trial court excluded certain tax receipts offered in evidence by the
plaintiff. The exclusion of the tax receipts reduced the amount the plaintiff could recover, but lie was still entitled to more than nominal damages.
Upon appeal by the plaintiff after a nonsuit, it was held that the nonsuit
was voluntary since he could still recover substantial damages.
From these cases we may conclude that a nonsuit is always voluntary when taken after the trial court has refused to give instructions
offered by plaintiff. A nonsuit will be regarded as voluntary even when
the instructions given by the court are erroneous, provided the instructions
given, whether they be correct or erroneous, permit a recovery of more
than nominal damages. A nonsuit is involuntary when taken after the
trial court has given instructions which prevent a recovery, or which permit the recovery of only nominal damages.
In addition to the pleading, evidence, and instruction cases there have
been some miscellaneous cases. These will be considered separately.
Recently the Kansas City Court of Appeals, in Pilkington v. Pilk2 04
ington,
held a nonsuit involuntary in a divorce action where the trial
court refused to permit a nonsuit to be taken after the court had sustained
defendant's demurrer to the evidence, whereupon the plaintiff purported
to take a nonsuit. A refusal to permit the plaintiff to take a nonsuit can
hardly be regarded as precluding a substantial recovery, but it was so
considered in this case. Had the nonsuit been regarded as taken because
of the ruling of the court sustaining the demurrer to the evidence the
case would be in accord with those cases in which a nonsuit was taken after
a verdict had been directed for the defendant, but this was not the case.
In Darnc v. Broadwater10 5 the plaintiff moved for a continuance. In
support of his motion for a continuance he filed an affidavit stating that
one of his duly summoned witnesses had failed to appear, and that the

103.
104.
105.

83 Mo. 138 (1884).

230 Mo. App. 569, 93 S. W. (2d) 1068 (1936).
9 Mo. 19 (1845). The court said, "The refusal to grant a continuance

is a matter of error, as has been repeatedly adjudged by this court; and though

it has been suggested that these adjudications have been made in cases where
a trial was had, no good reason is perceived why the principle is not equally
applicable to cases where a nonsuit is submitted to, and the consequent expense
of a useless investigation saved to the parties."
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facts sought to be proved by this witness could not be proved in any
other way. Plaintiff took a nonsuit after the continuance was refused.
On appeal the court held this was an involuntary nonsuit. No reason was
given why the witness could not have been attached forthwith. 0" This
case is of particular interest in connection with the method employed by
the plaintiff to show that the ruling of the court prevented him from proceeding further when it is not apparent from the record, or the nature of
the ruling itself. Here the plaintiff used an affidavit to supply this information.
In Poc v. Dominic7r0 the defendant took a change of venue. Thereafter
the plaintiff moved to remand the case because the proceedings in making
the transfer were irregular. This motion being denied, plaintiff took a
nonsuit and appealed. The appellate court held the nonsuit was voluntary
because this ruling did not prevent plaintiff from recovery in the lower
court.
In at least seven cases appearing before the Supreme Court of Missouri and the Courts of Appeals the courts have held the nonsuit taken
by the plafitiff-was voluntary- and not appealable, but have, nevertheless,
reviewed the lower court proceedings. In a few of these cases the appellate court has found the trial.court in error, but has affirmed the judgment
of nonsuit, or dismissed the appeal because an appeal cannot be had after
a voluntary nonsuit.0 8 The result has been that the plaintiff in these

106.

Compare English v. Mullanphy, 1 Mo. 780 (1827).

107.
108.

46 Mo. 113 (1870).
Sone v. Palmer, 28 Mo. 539 (1859), the Supreme Court in this case

In this case the

plaintiff did apply for and obtained an attachment, but not to the same term.
reviewed certain rulings of the trial court on questions concerning the admissibility of evidence, at the same time holding that the nonsuit taken was voluntary.
In Gentry County v. Black & Seat, 32 Mo. 542 (1862), the trial court excluded from the evidence the bond sued on. The answer admitted the execution
of the bond. On appeal it was held the bond was properly excluded; the court
at the same time held the nonsuit taken by plaintiff was voluntary.
In Rainey v. Edmonson, 33 Mo. 375 (1863), the trial court instructed the
jury that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff. On appeal it was held that
a nonsuit taken as a result of this ruling was a voluntary nonsuit, but the

court also held that the instruction was improper.
Chiles v. Wallace, 83 Mo. 84 (1884). In this case the appellate court

reviewed instructions given by the trial court, at the same time holding that

the nonsuit taken by plaintiff as a result of the instructions was voluntary.

In State ex rel. Meramec Iron Co. v. Gaddy, 83 Mo. 138 (1884), the Supreme Court reviewed rulings of the trial court as to the admissibility of evi-

dence offered by the plaintiff, but at the same time holding the nonsuit taken
by plaintiff was voluntary.
Schulter's Adm'r v. Bockwinkle's Adm'r, 19 Mo. 647 (1854).

In this case

the Supreme Court reviewed a ruling of the trial court refusing to strike out

defendant's answer, but held the nonsuit taken by the plaintiff was voluntary.
In Williams v. Finks, 156 Mo. 597, 57 S. W. 732 (1900), the appellate court

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss2/1
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cases obtained the benefits of a review of the lower court proceedings
which will be useful when he institutes a second suit, although he has had
to pay the cost of the first suit.
Thus in Scott v. American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Co.,19 the plaintiff took a nonsuit after the trial court had refused to give the instructions
presented by him. The appellate court held the nonsuit was voluntary,
but nevertheless held that the trial court erred in refusing to give the
instructions. Judge Farrington, in affirming the judgment of the lower
court on the ground that the nonsuit was voluntary said:
"No substantial injustice can result to him from this enforcement of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court for our guidance. Ile is substantially in the same position so far as ultimately
securing a trial on the merits of his case as if he had secured an
order here remanding the cause, having taken a nonsuit and
his cause of action not being barred by limitation."
The plaintiff in this case would have to pay the cost of the first suit,
whereas, had his nonsuit been regarded as involuntary and a new trial
ordered, the taxation of cost would have abided the ultimate outcome of
the second trial.
There is a still larger group of cases in which the appellate courts
have held that the nonsuit was voluntary and refused to review the
proceedings of the lower court on the ground that an appeal could not
No reason can be
be had after a voluntary nonsuit has been taken."1'
found why the appellate courts have on occasion reviewed the lower court
proceedings after a voluntary nonsuit has been taken, or why they have
refused to do so in other similar cases. It may be that the appellate court,
knowing that the plaintiff could sue over again, thought that considerable
time would be saved in rendering its opinion on the erroneous rulings
made, to the end that in the second suit the trial court would not again
commit the same errors, and thus make necessary a third trial. However,
if this is admitted to be a valid reason, then why doesn't it apply to all
cases?
In a few of these cases it was necessary to review the lower court

reviewed a ruling of the trial court excluding the promissory note sued on
from the evidence, but held the nonsuit taken was voluntary.
109. 187 Mo. App. 344, 173 S. W. 23 (1915).
110. Dumey v. Schoeffler, 20 Mo. 323 (1855); Louisiana & Middletown
Plank Road Co. v. Mitchell, 20 Mo. 432 (1855); Hageman v. Moreland, 33 Mo.
86 (1862); Layton v. Riney, 33 Mo. 87 (1862); Poe v. Dominic, 46 Mo. 113
(1870); Koger v. Hays, 57 Mo. 327 (1874); Loring v. Cooke, 60 Mo. 564 (1875);
Netzow Mfg. Co. v. Baker, 137 Mo. App. 670 (1909); International Harvester
App.Scholarship
221, 52 Repository,
S. W. (2d)1940227 (1932).
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proceedings to determine whether or not the ruling of the court prevented
a recovery. Thus a review of the lower court proceedings is had for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not the nonsuit taken was involuntary
and therefore appealable."'
This result is awkward and suggests that
the distinction made between voluntary and involuntary nonsuits in Missouri is not a practical one.
Statute of Limitations
The M1issouri statute of limitations provides that a plaintiff who has
taken a nonsuit may commence a new action from time to time, within
one year after such nonsuit has been suffered.1 1 2- This statute does not
shorten the period within which the plaintiff might otherwise sue, but extends the time within which he can sue over in those eases where his
second suit would otherwise be barred by lapse of time. This statute
is essentially a "saving clause," and as such, it gives to plaintiff an ad-

111. Gentry County v. Black & Seat, 32 Mo. 542 (1862); Williams v. Finks,
156 Mo. 597, 57 S. W. 732 (1900).
112. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 874, "If any action shall have been commenced. withinthe times respectively prescribed in article 8 and 9 of this chapter, and the plaintiff therein suffer a nonsuit, or, after a verdict for him, the
judgment be arrested, or, after a judgment for him, the same be reversed on
appeal or error, such plaintiff may commence a new action from time to time,
within one year after such nonsuit suffered or such judgment arrested or
reversed; and if the cause of action survive or descend to his heirs, or survive
to his executors or administrators, they may, in like manner, commence a new
action within the time herein allowed to such plaintiff, or, if no executor or
administrator be qualified, then within one year after letters testamentary or
of administration shall have been granted to him." This statute in its present
form has been in effect in Missouri since 1845. See Mo. REV. STAT. (1845) 718;
Mo. REV. STAT. (1855) 1051; Mo. REV. STAT. (1865) 748; Mo. REV. STAT.
(1879) § 3239; Mo. REV. STAT. (1889) . 6784; Mo. REV. STAT. (1919) § 1329.
The original statute was enacted in 1825. The wording of that statute
differed from the present statute. See Mo. REv. STAT. (1825) 510, "That if in
any of the above mentioned cases, any plaintiff obtain a judgment, which upon
appeal or writ of error shall be reversed; or if a verdict pass for the plaintiff,
and upon matter alleged in arrest of judgment, the judgment be given against
the plaintiff that he take nothing by his writ; or if any plaintiff shall suffer
non-suit,--such plaintiff, his heirs, executors or administrators, as the case may
require, may commence a new action or suit, from time to time, within one year
after such judgment recovered, or arrested, or non-suit suffered, as aforesaid.
The act of 1825 was revised in 1835, see Mo. REV. STAT. (1835) 395, which
reads as follows: "If any action shall have been commenced within the times
respectively prescribed in the preceding articles of this act, and the plaintiff
therein suffer a non-suit, or, after a verdict for him, the judgment be arrested, or, after a judgment for him, the same be reversed on appeal or error,
such plaintiff may commence a new action, from time to time, within one year
after such non-suit suffered, or such judgment arrested or reversed; and if
the cause of action survive or descend to his heirs, or survive to his executors
or administrators, they may, in like manner, commence a new action within the
time herein allowed to such plaintiff."
No attempt will be made to discuss the operation of this statute as it relates
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss2/1
to matters other than nonsuits.
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ditional year in which to file a second suit. However, to receive the benefit of this statute the first suit must be filed within the period allowed
by the general statute of limitations.
Thus in Thompson v. Farmers Exchange Banku, n 3 the plaintiff sued
for damages for false imprisonment within two years after his cause of
action accrued. The two year statute of limitations applied to actions of
this nature. A demurrer to the petition was sustained, and a nonsuit
taken. Plaintiff led a second suit within one year after the nonsuit, but
more than two years after his cause of action had first accrued. A demurrer was sustained to plaintiff's petition on the ground that it showed
on its face that the statute of limitations had run. On appeal the judgment of the lower court was reversed, the court holding that the plaintiff
could sue over within one year after a judgment of nonsuit.
Again in Estes v. Fry,"4 the Missouri Supreme Court held that a
suit on a note begun within one year after the plaintiff had taken a nonsuit in a former action, which was itself begun within ten years after the
last payment thereon, is not barred by the statute of limitations. Here
the second action was begun more than ten years after the last payment.
It was admitted that the ten year statute of limitations ordinarily applied
5
to actions of this kind."
When either party appeals after a nonsuit, does the one year statute
begin to run from the time of the judgment of nonsuit in the lower court,
or from the time the judgment of nonsuit is affirmed on appeal? In
.Missouri it is uniformly held that the one year statute in such cases begins
to run from the time the judgment is affirmed on appeal. In Chouteau v.
Rowsc,"' plaintiff filed suit in October, 1868, to recover back money paid
to the tax collector, but not applied for the payment of his taxes. This
action resulted in a directed verdict for the defendant, whereupon plaintiff took a nonsuit and appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court April 20, 1874. Afterwards on June 22, 1874, a

113. 333 Mo. 437, 62 S. W. (2d) 803 (1933).
114. 166 Mo. 70, 65 S. W. 741 (1901).
115. For other cases involving the same problem as Estes v. Fry, see, Shaw
v. Pershing, 57 Mo. 416 (1874); Mason v. Kansas City Belt Ry., 226 Mo. 212,
125 S. W. 1128 (1910); Seewald v. Gentry, 220 Mo. App. 367, 286 S. W. 445
(1926).
116. 56 Mo. 65 (1874), first suit, and 90 Mo. 191 (1886), second suit. For
other cases involving the same questions, see, Woods v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 149
Mo. App. 507, 130 S. W. 1123 (1910); Woods v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 192 Mo.
App. 165, 179 S. W. 727 (1915). Wetmore v. Crouch, 55 Mo. App. 441 (1893);
Wetmore v. Crouch, 150 Mo. 671, 51 S. W. 738 (1899); Wetmore v. Crouch,
188 Mo. 647, 87 S. W. 954 (1905).
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second suit was filed for the same cause. The defendant in his answer to
the second suit pleaded the five year statute of limitations. Plaintiff replied that he filed his second suit within one year after the judgment of
nonsuit was affirmed on appeal, but more than one year after a judgmenl
of nonsuit was entered in the lower court. The defendant contended the
reply was bad because the one year statute began to run from the time the
nonsuit was taken in the lower court. The Supreme Court denied defendant's contention and held that the one year statute does not begin to
run in those cases in which an appeal is taken until the appeal is determined.
From these decisions it is clear that the one year statute of limitations
begins to run from the time the lower court enters a judgment of nonsuit,
unless an appeal is had, in which case the operation of the statute is suspended until the appeal is determined, and the plaintiff may sue over
within one year after the judgment of nonsuit is affirmed on appeal.
In several cases it has been argued that the one year statute of limitations requires the plaintiff to file his second suit within one year, or be
forever barred. To give to the statute this interpretation would be to
shorten the time within which the plaintiff might file suit in many cases.
17
This-view-has-been definitely rejected in Missouri. Thus in Tate v. Jacobs,1
the plaintiff brought an action for damages. He took a nonsuit in this
action, and then brought a second suit for the same cause within five years
from the time his cause of action accrued, but more than one year after
his nonsuit in the former action. In the second action the defendant
pleaded the one year statute of limitations. Plaintiff contended the five
year general statute of limitations applied. The lower court ruled in favor
of defendant's contention, and plaintiff appealed. On appeal the court
held that the one year statute of limitations does not require that a plaintiff who has taken a nonsuit must bring his second suit within one year,
for the one year statute does not apply where the second action instituted
by the plaintiff was commenced within the period otherwise allowed by the
general statutes of limitations s

117.
118.

47 Mo. App. 218 (1891).
No attempt has been made to make an exhaustive study of the opera-

tion of the one year statute of limitations. Other problems arise which I
thought best not to consider in detail, but to which I will briefly refer.
(A) The one year statute does not apply where the plaintiff begins a
second suit before he dismisses the first suit, Missouri & S. W. Land Co. v.
Quinn, 172 Mo. 563, 73 S. W. 184 (1903); but see Briant v. Fudge, 63 Mo.

489 (1876).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss2/1
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In Earn, '. .1m, riani Fire Ins. Co.,"' the Supreme Court of Missouri
had before it tle,- xsame, problem as that presented in Tate'v. Jacobs. In
the Karn s vase Ite court said:
"The time, for bringing plaintiff's suit under the general
provisions of the limitation law had not expired when she commenced the present action. The claim is that, having brought
the defendant into court, and then having suffered a nonsuit,
she could not, under section 6784, supra, begin a new proceeding
after one year from the date of the nonsuit, notwithstanding the
general statute of limitations had not run against her claim. In
other words, that, although a cause of action might not be barred
for ten years, yet if suit should be commenced and a nonsuit
taken within one year after the cause arose, plaintiff must bring
her action within one year thereafter. We do not so understand
the statute. The section under consideration was not intended
to shorten the time given by the general provisions of the limitation act, but is a saring clause to prevent the bar which would
otherwise be applicable. It does not purport to limit the time for
bringing suits, but to save from the statute, for one year after nonsuit, actions which, but for its provisions, would be barred."
Conclusions
Does the device of an involuntary nonsuit as known in Missouri serve
any useful purpose? In answering this question it may be asked whether
the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of nonsuit in order to obtain a
new trial? He can obtain a new trial with less trouble and delay by
simply instituting a new suit. Then it may be asked, why does he seek an
order for a new trial on appeal? When lie sues over without moving for

(B) Where a special statutory right has been created which contains its
own statute of limitations, the one year statute permitting an action to be
brought within one year after a nonsuit is taken does not apply, Gerren v.
Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 60 Mo. 405 (1875) ; State ex rel. Mackey v. Thompson,
81 Mo. App. 549 (1899).
(C) The wrongful death statute contains its own period of limitations, but
also contains a section permitting the plaintiff to file a second suit within one
year after he has taken a nonsuit. Clark v. Kansas City, St. L. & C. R. R.,
219 Mo. 524, 118 S. W. 40 (1909); Boyd v. Logan Jones Dry Goods Co., 335
Mo. 947, 74 S. W. (2d) 598 (1934).
(D) The one year statute of limitations does not apply unless the cause
of action is the same in both suits. St. Charles Sav. Bank v. Thompson, 284
Mo. 72, 223 S. W. 734 (1920); Stevens Lumber Co. v. Kansas City Lumber Co.,
72 Mo. App. 248 (1897); Kissane v. Brewer, 208 Mo. App. 244, 232 S. W.
1106 (1921).
(E)
Where the plaintiff begins his first suit in the courts of another
state, or in the federal courts, then takes a nonsuit, and files a second suit in
the courts of Missouri within one year the one year statute applies. Shaw v.
Pershing, 57 Mo. 416 (187-1); Clark v. Kansas City, St. L. & C. R. R., 219
Mo. 524, 118 S. W. 40 (19)09).
(F) Query: Does the one year statute of limitations apply where the
court in the first suit had neither jurisdiction over the person or subject matter
of the action? Mertens v. MeMahon, 115 S. W. (2d) 180 (Mo. App. 1938).
119. 144 Mo. 413, 46 S. W. 166 (1898).
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a new trial tile costs of the first suit will be taxed against him; whereas,
if he can obtain an order for a new trial from either the trial court or on
appeal, the taxation of costs will abide the ultimate outcome of the action.
The decision of the reviewing court disposes of no greater question tiian
who should pay the cost of the first trial.
Those who would defend this procedural device argue that by permitting an appeal the parties to the action obtain a review of the proceedings
of the lower court which will be beneficial to both the trial court iiid
the parties in a second trial or suit. There is some force in this contention.
However, it is not necessary to permit an appeal from a judgment of
nonsuit in order to obtain a review of the lower court proceedings. A
review may be had by appealing after a verdict and judgment have been
rendered on the merits. Why then, does the plaintiff choose to take a
nonsuit as the result of an adverse ruling and appeal from a final judgment of nonsuit rather than participate in the remainder of the trial, and
appeal from a judgment on the merits? By taking a nonsuit after an
adverse ruling the plaintiff is saved the trouble and expense of proceeding
with the trial in the lower court. The weight to be given to this consideration depends upon how early in the trial the nonsuit is taken. Very
little, if any. time or expense is,-saved- when the nonsuit is taken as the
result of a verdict having been directed for the defendant, and it is in
these cases that the practice of taking a nonsuit is used most frequently.
What little advantage there is in permitting an appeal by a plaintiff
from a judgment of iionsuit is easily offset by other disadvantages. When
an appeal is taken from a judgment on the merits, the appellate court
will have before it for review all the errors which it is contended were
committed by the trial court. When a nonsuit is taken only those errors
committed up until the time that the plaintiff took a nonsuit will be before
the court for review. If it is one purpose of an appeal to aid the trial court
and the parties in a second suit or trial, then it cannot be denied that a
review of the entire proceedings in the lower court will offer greater advantages than a review of only part of the proceedings leaving the remainder to be reviewed on a subsequent appeal. Afore time and expense
will be consumed than would have been the case had an appeal been taken
from a final judgment on the merits. Then, too, the appellate court can
more efficiently dispatch its business if it can review the entire proceedings of the trial court rather than review the alleged errors of the trial
court piecemeal on two or more occasions.
A judgment on the merits rendered against the plaintiff in the lower
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss2/1
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court, and subsequently affirmed on appeal is rcs adjudicata. A judgment
of nonsuit affirmed on appeal is not res adjudicala, and consequently the
plaintiff may bring another action. *Why should the plaintiff be permitted to sue over after both the trial court and the appellate court have
found against him? The doctrine of res adjudictla is designed for the
very purpose of preventing a party who has had one fair trial before a
court having jurisdiction from relitigating the same question. There
should be some end to litigation. A decision of an appellate court affirming a judgment of nonsuit is in effect a declaration that the plaintiff had
a fair trial up until the time he took a nonsuit. The plaintiff should not
be heard to complain on appeal that the nonsuit he asked for was given
him. The Missouri courts permit him to do this.
The plaintiff has the right to take a nonsuit at any time before the
case is submitted to the court or jury and then file a second suit. This is
a very great privilege in itself, and one which can be abused so as to
harass his adversary. The right to take a nonsuit and sue over is given
to the plaintiff because even the most righteous cause may fail now and
then from unforeseen contingencies, accidental omissions, mistakes in procedure, or other circumstances unconnected with the merits.2 0
The
continued existence of this right is justified, even though an opponent is
harassed thereby, for even greater hardship would result to the plaintiff
should the right to take a nonsuit and sue over be destroyed absolutely.
By permitting an appeal after a nonsuit is taken, the Missouri courts have
extended this privilege and have enabled the plaintiff not only to sue
over, but to shift the payment of costs, both of the first trial and on appeal,
to the defendant in the event the appellate court orders a new trial in
which the plaintiff ultimately prevails. This gives the plaintiff another
tool with which to harass the defendant,1 2 ' and in addition requires the

120. Houston's Adm'r v. Thompson's Adm'r, 87 Mo. App. 63 (1901).
121. The following cases illustrate how the plaintiff can keep the same action alive for an extended period of time through the n. e of this device: (1)
Chouteau v. Rowse, 56 Mo. 65 (1874); Chouteau v. Rows , 90 Mo. 191 (1886).
(2) Wetmore v. Crouch, 55 Mo. App. 441 (1893); Wetmore v. Crouch, 150 Mo.
671, 51 S. W. 738 (1899); Wetmore v. Crouch, 188 Mo. 647, 87 S. W. 954 (1905).
(3) Hewitt v. Steele, 118 Mo. 463, 24 S. W. 440 (1893); Hewitt v. Steele, 136
Mo. 327, 38 S. W. 82 (1896).
(4) Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 160 Fed.
382 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908); Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 177 Fed. 893 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1910); Manning v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., 176 Mo. App. 678, 159 S. W.
750 (1913). (5) Mason v. K. C. Belt Ry., 226 Mo. 212, 125 S. W. 1128 (1910).
(6)
Johnson v. United Railways Co., 227 Mo. 423, 127 S. W. 63 (1910);
Johnson v. United Railways Co., 243 Mo. 278, 147 S. W. 1077 (1912).
(7)
Woods v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 149 Mo. App. 507, 130 S. W. 1123 (1910); Woods
v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 192 Mo. App. 165, 179 S. W. 727 (1915).
(8) Boyd v.
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al)pellate eourt to consume its time in liearing the appeal for flie sole purpose of determining who should pay the cost of tIe first I rial, while at the
same time increasing the total cost arid personal expenses ol hot l

)arties.

Should the plaintiff be permitted to shift the cost to the defendant?
It is the plaintiff who brought the defendant into court, and it is not
necessarily his fault that the trial court erroneously ruled so as to prevent
the plaintiff from recovering.

By permitting the plaintiff to take a non-

suit and sue over, the defendant is compelled to defend himself twice.

It

seems only just to require the plaintiff to bear the cost of this first wasted
effort to recover from the defendant.
Alabama,' 2 2

Florida,"

and North

Carolina 2' - ' are the only other

states employing a procedural device similar to our involuntary nonsuit.
Judge Sanborn, speaking for the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in Franciscov. Chicago & A. R. R.," : severely eriti-

Logan Jones Dry Goods Co., 335 Mo. 947, 74 S. W. (2d) 598 (1934); Boyd v.
Logan Jones Dry Goods Co., 340 Mo. 1100, 104 S. W. (2d) 348 (1937).
122. Berlin Machine Works v. Ewart Lumber Co., 184 Ala. 272, 63 So. 567
(1013); Bush v. Russell, 180 Ala. 590, 61 So. 373 (1913).
123. Mizell Live Stock Co. v. McCaskill Co., 57 Fla. 118, 49 So. 501 (1909).
124. Collins v. Swanson, 121 N. C. 67, 28 S. E. 65 (1897); Morton v. Blades
Lumber Co., 144 N_ C. 31, 56 S. F_ 551 (1907).
125. 149 Fed. 354 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906). In this case Judge Sanborn said,
"It has been a fixed rule of practice of the appellate courts of the United
States for almost 100 years that no writ of error will lie at the suit of a plaintiff to review a judgment of nonsuit which has been rendered at his request or
with his .consent, and that no judgment will be reversed for an error which the
plaintiff in the writ has invited the court to commit, and the fact that the
Supreme Court of Missouri calls such a nonsuit 'involuntary' and reviews it
presents no persuasive reason why one of the national appellate courts should
depart from this salutary rule while there are many reasons why it should
abide by and enforce it. Courts are established and maintained to settle and
terminate controversies between citizens and to enforce their rights, not to
furnish debating societies for the trial of legal experiments. The chief reason
for their being is to end, not te mnrpetuate, disputes. 'Interest reipublicae ut
sit finis litium.' A practice which permits a plaintiff to experiment with the
courts and to harass the defendant interminably at will runs counter to the basic
purpose of legal tribunals and of all civilized governments, and, instead of assisting to wisely administer justice, it inflicts and perpetuates wrong. Yet this
is the practice which a grave review of such nonsuits as that in hand would
establish. Under it a plaintiff could introduce his evidence and try the Circuit
Court to see whether or not it would sustain his action. If it granted a motion to instruct a verdict against him, he could procure from the court an
involuntary nonsuit then sue out a writ of error and try the appellate court,
and. if it would not sustain his action, he could pay the costs, bring another
action for the same cause, and continue his actions and experiments interminably. The federal courts ought not to perioit themselves to be made the subjects
of such experiments. The only material i iferests involved in the review of
such judgments are the costs of the actions, for the plaintiffs may try their
causes again whatever the decisions of the appellate courts, and the demands
upon these courts for the decision of real and important issues are too grave
and pressing to permit them to devote their time to litigation so frivolous.
"There is a more compelling reason why proceedings of this nature should not
be sustained. The plaintiff is not the only party to a lawsuit who has rights.
The defendant has some, and one of them is the right, not only to a fair and
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cized this device. Federal courts sitting iii Missouri, though required by
the Conformity Act to follow our Code or civil lrocedure have refused
to permit an appeal after a nonsuit and no hardship has resulted.
The device of involuntary nonsuit as known in Missouri is a judicial
invention. Its existence cannot be traced to any statutory origin. It
could and should be destroyed by the same hand whic.h created it. Thus
the judiciary may contribute to remove some of the law's delay.

impartial trial of, the action against him, but to a final adjudication of the
alleged cause which the plaintiff presents and to a termination of the litigation
upon it. This right he can never enforce, this termination he can never secure
under the practice here proposed, for there is no limit to the number of actions
on the same cause, or on the want of it, which the plaintiff may bring, review,
and dismiss under it.
"The conclusion is that a writ of error will not lie in a national appellate
court at the suit of the plaintiff to review a judgment of nonsuit or dismissal
which has been rendered at his request or with his consent after the court has
held at the close of the trial that the defendant is entitled to a verdict."
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